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PATTERNS OF PARLIAMENTARY
LEGISLATION, 1660-1800*
JULIAN HOPPIT
University College London
A B S T R A C T . Before i68gparliament met relatively infrequently and unpredictably,passing limited
amounts of legislation. After that date parliament met annually and enacted a significantly enhanced
volume of legislation. By relating attempts to legislate to patterns of acts this transformation is
explored at a very general level. Some explanations are advanced, largely by examining institutional
arrangements and the subject matter of legislation. Finally, some general observations on the
significance of this 'revolution in parliament' are advanced.
In the 203 years between the accession of Henry VII in 1485 and the flight of
James II in 1688 the Westminster parliament passed nearly 2,700 acts,
excluding the constitutionally troubled years 1642 to 1660.1 In the 112 years
from the Glorious revolution to union with Ireland over 13,600 acts were
passed. This dramatic rise in legislative output was a most remarkable
development and one of significance for historians of all shades. Yet if it has
not been ignored, it has been surprisingly little studied in a general way, for
the parliamentary history of this era still often follows the agenda of ' high
politics'.2 This paper explores aspects of a different agenda and sets out to
provide a general view of the great growth of law making. When precisely did
this growth occur? Was it due to a greater demand for legislation or to
parliament's enhanced capacity to make law? What sorts of acts were
contemplated and being passed?
This article follows a structural and quantitative approach as the best way
of being precise yet general. But there are obvious limitations involved, for
ultimately legislation is the product of particular circumstances and to
* This article arises from a project directed by myself, Joanna Innes and John Styles and
generously funded by the Leverhulme Trust, with the British Academy providing some supporting
financing. The research assistance of Simon Renton, Nyani Samarsinghe and Edmund Green was
invaluable. Many thanks to Henry Horwitz, Joanna Innes and Paul Langford for commenting on
an earlier version of this article.
1
 All counts of acts in this article are taken from O. Ruffhead (ed.), Statutes at large..., 18 vols.
(1769-1800). C. H. Firth & R. S. Rait (eds.), Acts and ordinances oj the interregnum, 1642-1660, 3 vols.
(1911) is a selection, numbering over 1,300.
2
 This is discussed in D. Lieberman, The province of legislation determined: legal theory in eighteenth-
century Britain (Cambridge, 1989), Introduction. P. Langford's excellent Public life and the propertied
Englishman, i68g-iyg8 (Oxford, 1991) is perhaps the best available discussion of parliament's
legislative activities. See also W. Holdsworth, A history of English law, 17 vols. (1922—72), esp. vol.
XI.
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Fig. i. Number of acts, 1660-1800 (7 session moving average).
concentrate upon aggregations and trends is to lose sight of this dimension. It
is not suggested that the structural and quantitative approach is superior,
simply that it provides the best means of detailing and initially exploring the
general nature of what was, in effect, a revolution in parliament.
I
It is a relatively easy task to count acts, though care must be taken before
c 1700 to ensure that they are accredited to the correct session.3 In Figure 1
sessional totals of acts have been charted as a moving average to show more
clearly the general trend. This shows that the volume of acts was low and
declining between 1660 and 1688, rose markedly between 1689 and 1702,
stagnated between the accession of Anne and c 1750 before an era of
remarkable growth from 1760, albeit one interrupted by a no less remarkable
trough that reached its nadir in the early 1780s.
Was the rise in legislative activity in this period small or large? Here a
yardstick is needed. First, enactments can be related to the frequency with
which parliament met. Before 1688 the average number of acts passed each
session was almost 26. After 1760 the figure was 194, nearly an eight-fold rise.
But as sessions varied in length it is possible to express this more precisely as
a ratio of acts passed to the number of days business was conducted in the
Commons. For 1660-88 the ratio is 0-36 and for 1760-1800 1 -95, a 5-4 fold rise.
A second critical issue was that the legislative jurisdiction of Westminster
3
 Done by checking the date acts received their royal assent. Session dates are in E. B. Fryde,
D. E. Greenway, S. Porter & I. Roy (eds.), Handbook of British chronology, 3rd edn (1986), pp.
576-80, with two corrections: the session beginning on 19 May 1685 ended on 20 November 1685,
not 2 July (when parliament was adjourned but not prorogued); the session of 14-24 April 1707
must be added. Because compilations of statutes and the Journals sometimes use different regnal
years (and none follows precisely C. R. Cheney, Handbook of dates for students of English history
(1970), pp. 26-8), I refer to sessions by their dates.
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changed in this period. Most generally, apart from American independence
the British empire expanded significantly. Legislators at Westminister were
increasingly being called upon to contemplate issues in North America, the
West Indies, Asia and elsewhere. More specifically, in 1707 the parliaments of
Westminster and Edinburgh were united. Though this might be expected to
have had an effect Figure 1 shows that there was no immediate impact. Even
over the longer term after 1707 relatively few acts passed at Westminster
exclusively or largely concerned Scotland. Furthermore, though changes
occurred in the relationship between Westminster, the Dublin parliament and
other representative assemblies within the wider empire it is difficult at this
stage to see the impact of this upon legislative patterns.4 A third factor is of
more significance in interpreting the general rise. By the end of the eighteenth
century nearly a quarter of all acts explained, continued, expanded or
amended existing legislation (in the Restoration era the figure had been only
7-4 per cent). This was particularly the case with turnpike trusts whose life was
extended or terms altered. It could be argued that such acts were not new and
creative, to the extent that the growth of legislative output shown in Figure 1
might be mentally scaled down. Even so, taking all three qualifications, it
remains the case that between 1660 and 1800 there was a very considerable
rise in the number of acts being passed.
Crudely, the volume of legislation is the outcome of the demand for acts and
the capacity or willingness of parliament to meet that demand. To assess this
relationship it is essential to compare the numbers of acts to totals of attempts
to pass acts. This is not easy to do. There is a definitional problem of what
constitutes an attempt as well as problems of evidence. In practice any
systematic list of attempts must be compiled by a detailed trawl through the
Journals} Those attempts that failed to leave an imprint there, whatever
their significance, must be ignored. From the Journals it is possible to identify
many failed bills and more expansively (if a little less certainly) all those
additional efforts - petitions, resolutions, motions and the like — which appear
to have had legislation as an aim.6 Some 7,025 failed legislative initiatives have
been identified for this period, the general incidence of which is charted in
Figure 2. Here the pattern is unlike that for acts, showing high levels not only
in the Restoration era but also in the parliaments of William III. Levels then
declined and were low from the Hanoverian accession to 1760 when they
4
 For a discussion of which see J . P. Greene, Peripheries and center: constitutional development in the
extended polities of the British empire and the United States I6OJ—IJ88 (Athens, Georgia, 1986); idem, The
quest for power: the lower houses of assembly in the southern royal colonies 1689-1776 (Chapel Hill, North
Carolina, 1963).
5
 A major part of this work was undertaken by Sheila Lambert and she has kindly made her
research notes available. For a fuller discussion and details see J . Hoppit (ed.), Failed legislation,
1660-1800: extracted from the Commons and Lords journals (forthcoming).
6
 A bill is taken to have had a physical existence. It is obviously demonstrated by those failures
which obtained at least a first reading (52'8 per cent for the period as a whole). Some failed bills,
however, fell short of even that hurdle.
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Fig. 2. Number of failed legislative initiatives, 1660-1800 (7 session moving average).
began to rise. Perhaps the most striking aspect of Figure 2 is that levels of failed
legislative initiatives were so high from 1689 to c 1702, years when the volume
of acts was rising.
With 14,216 acts passed between 1660 and 1800 and 7,025 failures, the
success rate of all attempts was 66.9 per cent. However, there was a dramatic
change in this proportion over time, as Figure 3 demonstrates. In the
Restoration period that rate was low and declining, starting at about a third
and finishing at less than a tenth. From 1689 the rate rose and reached what
might be called the eighteenth-century norm by c 1714 (the rate averaged 75.3
per cent between 1714 and 1800). Although- this graph shows some other
fluctuations these are usually the product of a few highly idiosyncratic sessions
influencing the moving average.7 It is the general trend that stands out: the
decline of the Restoration period, the rise under William and Anne and the
stability thereafter. This suggests that it was less the demand for acts than
parliament's handling of legislation which must be focused on from 1660 to
c 1714. Thereafter demand factors would appear to warrant closest attention.
It is, of course, simplistic to assume that 'supply' and 'demand' factors were
unrelated, but separating them helps identify a number of key factors at work.
Under Charles and James II only 28-2 per cent of attempts at legislation
succeeded. The situation changed dramatically after 1688, with success rates
rising to average 51-0 per cent for the years to 1714. The most potent
explanation for this is that the amount of time available to pass legislation
increased.8 To become an act bills have, as a minimum, within a single session
7
 As in the short session of April 1707 when there were five failures and no acts, giving a success
rate of zero.
8
 Numerically the role of the royal veto was insignificant; only 12 bills were vetoed in this
peirod, the last being by Anne. See also C. E. Fryer, 'The royal veto under Charles I I ' , English
Historical Review, xxxn (1917), 103-11. Through the eighteenth century direct royal influence
could still occasionally halt bills in their tracks, witness Fox's India bill.
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Fig. 3. Success rate of legislative initiatives, 1660-1800 (7 session moving average).
to be read three times and considered in committee in both Houses before
gaining the royal assent.9 Necessarily, processing a large number of bills takes
organization and time. The high failure rates before 1689 can probably be put
down mainly to the unpredictability of the incidence and duration of sessions.
Bills were often lost because of- the sudden and unexpected end of a session
rather than being positvely rejected. Unexpected prorogations because of
political tension between parliament and monarch killed bills which might
otherwise have made it to the statute book.
Eleven of the 22 sessions between 1660 and 1688 lasted less than 50 days,
whereas in the 121 sessions after 1688 there were only four which were so short
(other than those caused randomly by the death of the monarch).10 Allied to
this, in the Restoration era eight sessions came 300 days after the end of the
previous session. After 1689 no gap reached that length. The Glorious
revolution marked a sea change in the meetings of parliament and one which
happened quickly. Indeed, sessions in the 1690s were generally the longest for
the whole 140 year period. The reasons for this are well known. After 1688
parliament quickly asserted the power of the purse which, with the full
consequences of William Ill 's military operations, ensured that the timing of
sessions soon became a matter of routine. A parliamentary calendar was forged
that was, in certain respects, predictable. Sessions began either in the autumn
9
 On procedure see S. Lambert, Bills and acts: legislative practice in eighteenth century England
(Cambridge, 1971); P. D. G. Thomas, The house of commons in the eighteenth century (Oxford, 1971),
ch. 3; A.J. Rees, 'The practice and procedure of the house of lords 1714-1784' (University of
Wales Aberystwyth, Ph.D. thesis, 1987), ch. 3 and appendix 1.
10
 Length of sessions is taken from the Journals of the house of commons, noting when the Commons
actually met and conducted business (excluding days solely concerned with the consideration of
election disputes). Because of holidays and adjournments the dates of sessions imprecisely indicate
length. The average length of sessions in days was: 1660-1688, 705; 1689-1714, 1087;
1714-1760, 991 ; 1760-1800, 974.
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or January and lasted to late spring or early summer.11 But three qualifications
to this 1688 as turning point picture must be made. First, despite the high
failure rate of the Restoration years, large numbers of attempts to obtain
legislation continued to be made. If there was disillusionment with the
parliamentary process this did not manifest itself in a clear avoidance of taking
the legislative route. Second, the 1660s saw a number of long sessions. Five of
the nine sessions in that decade lasted over 100 days and the first session of the
Cavalier parliament was, at 179 days, the second longest session for the whole
of the period under discussion. There was a good deal of parliamentary
activity in the 1660s, much more so than between 1670 and 1688. Third, and
of more general import, if the success or failure of legislative initiatives was
simply a question of the predictability of length and periodicity of sessions then
1689 should immediately have seen success rates rise to the eighteenth-century
norm. But from Figure 3 it is clear that this rise took the best part of a quarter
of a century. Sessional length and periodicity provides an incomplete
explanation of patterns of success and failure.
Two broad, not incompatible, explanations are possible as to why success
rates improved gradually after 1689 rather than all at once.12 First that the
'rage of party' of those years created an unstable parliamentary situation that
was unconducive to turning bills into acts. The sorts of influences here may
have been: that the waging of war on an unprecedented scale left little time
in parliament to consider less pressing legislation; that party bickering created
too many distractions properly to timetable much legislative business; that
frequent parliaments made it hard to evolve new procedures to cope with the
flow of business and kept introducing new sets of MPs who were inexperienced
and imperfectly connected to constituents and others interested in instigating
bills. All of these are quite possible. The second, related, explanation is
essentially administrative: that parliament only gradually came to terms with
its new-found potential to conduct a heightened volume of legislation.13
Perhaps it took time to learn how to timetable bills, to order select committees
or to ensure only high-quality proposals were considered. The means by which
it realized its capacity for work and the forms that were needed to undertake
it were bound to take time.
The best evidence of administrative developments is provided by the history
of standing orders, that is those perpetual rules governing procedure. For the
Commons, such orders were first made in 1678 and there were 37 made
11
 The institutionalization of this in the 1690s was partly related to the absence of William and
other major figures during the campaigning season - he was out of Britain for 40 per cent of his
reign - requiring organizational forethought from both king and parliament. Absences calculated
from the dates given in C. Cook & J. Stevenson, British historical facts, i688-iy6o (Basingstoke,
1988), p. 3-
12
 Many important points are made in H. Horwitz, Parliament, policy and politics in the reign of
William III (Manchester, 1977).
13
 Some points are made in K. M. Ellis, 'The practice and procedure of the house of commons
1660-1714' (University of Wales Aberystwyth, Ph.D. thesis, 1993).
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between then and 1714.14 Looking at Commons standing orders relating to
private bills the first one was made in 1685 when it was declared that 'no
private bill be brought in except on a petition first made'. In 1697 another
order insisted that after a bill's first reading it had to be given a date for its
second reading. In 1699 a series of orders were made. The petition presenting
the bill had to provide 'Suggestions and Reasons for the same'; committees
considering bills had to give a week's public notice of sitting; committee
chairmen were obliged to confirm that the bill had been examined and that
the parties concerned had given their consent; and there had to be a space of
at least three days between readings. In 1705 it was ordered that private bills
be printed after presentation and before first reading and the procedure
ensuring that persons interested in private bills had given their consent was
tightened.15 Similar standing orders were introduced in the Lords between
1698 and 1706.16 The effect of all this was to introduce some uniformity of
practice to both Houses, provide a skeleton timetable for many bills, ensure
that they were dealt with consistently and above board and prevent them
getting lost in the melee of other business. Bills had to be justified, publicized
and examined, with opposition being met before not after they became acts.
Other developments at much the same time, such as the growing use of
sessional orders, the daily printing of a record of activity in the Votes and the
expansion of clerical support in parliament also helped to introduce a sense of
order and responsibility into the legislative process between 1689 and 1710.17
These procedures remained relatively unchanged through the rest of the
eighteenth century. So, under William and Anne both Houses began to
organize their legislative business much more carefully. It may well be that
parliament was becoming aware of organizational problems before 1688, but
was only able purposefully to resolve them in the 1690s and 1700s, more
particularly perhaps with peace in 1697. That they were resolved by the
accession of George I seems clear. Sessions between 1714 and 1760 were
shorter on average than for any period since 1688 yet the number of failed
initiatives was very low.18 Indeed, by the end of the 1720s the handling of
business was well enough established to allow a five day week in parliament.
This was no small change, for under the later Stuarts Saturday sitting had
been the norm. All in all, by the second half of Walpole's hegemony many
administrative and clerical developments within parliament had been
significantly advanced.
Before 1714 the growth of law making was in good measure a function of
14
 B. Kemp, Votes and standing orders of the house of commons: the beginning (1971), p. 6.
15
 O. C. Williams, The historical development of private bill procedure and standing orders in the house of
commons, 2 vols. (1948-9), 11, 262.
u
 Remembrances: or, a compleat collection of the standing orders of the house of lords in England (1744).
17
 O. C. Williams, The clerical organization of the house of commons 1661—1850 (Oxford, 1954), pp-
53-7. See also The minute book of James Courthope, ed. O. C. Williams, Camden Miscellany, xx (1953).
18
 The average number of failed initiatives per session was: 1660-1688, 653; 1689-1714, 6o-i;
1714-1760, 26-2; 1760-1800, 597.
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parliament meeting more frequently, for longer and more predictable sessions
and arranging its business more carefully. That is, what might be called supply
side issues were crucial. But such factors can only have limited relevance in
explaining changing levels of legislative activity thereafter. There were a
number of new standing orders after 1770, especially relating to particular
classes of legislation (such as enclosure, turnpikes and small debt courts) but
these were not different in kind from earlier orders and probably had only a
small impact upon procedural practice. How parliament handled the great
growth of law making after 1760 is, as yet, obscure. Perhaps the organizational
problems were inconsiderable and easily accommodated within existing
practices. If there were problems and solutions devised they are largely lost
from view. The Journals tell us little about the length and intensity of the
parliamentary day or of how the vital business conducted by select committees
was ordered. From c 1780 they do begin to note that sittings occasionally
extended beyond midnight, suggesting that the pressure of business was
mounting. What does seem clear is that any procedural changes that may
have taken place were a response to a heightened demand for legislation after
1760.
II
Investigating the demand for legislation requires an analysis of the types of
legislation being considered. At the time the only categorization routinely
employed was to distinguish between public and private measures. But that
distinction inconsistently reflected the purposes of legislation. So, for example,
local turnpike acts were public bills (they affected the king's highway and
levied a charge on the public), whereas the Vast majority of enclosure acts,
which were similarly local, were private. 'Public' and 'private' are by
themselves largely unhelpful analytical categories.19 At the most general level
one way forward is to distinguish those acts which were general and had a
national provenance from those which were essentially local, highly particular
or personal in their concerns. Such a distinction is not absolutely watertight,
but it is relatively unproblematic. Remembering that four main periods in the
development of legislative activity have been identified a count of local and
general acts is presented in Table 1.
Most acts concerned issues that were specific and often highly local, arising
from the ambitions of individuals or small groups. But that dominance was not
unchanging over time. The growth of law making in the generation following
See Lambert, Bills and acts, pp. 172-80. The numbers of public and private acts were:
Public (%) Private (%)
1660-1688
1689—1714
1714-1760
1760-1800
1660-1800
253
681
1924
4827
7685
449
38-9
54'2
57-8
54' 1
3"
1071
1625
3524
653'
551
611
45-8
42-2
45'9
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Table i. Specific and general acts, 1660-1800
Specific General All % Local
1660-1688
1689-1714
1714-1760
1760-1800
1660-1800
359
1 173
2635
6206
10373
205
579
9 H
2145
3843
564
1752
3549
835>
14216
637
67-0
74-2
74'3
Source: Statutes at large.
T a b l e 2. Success rates of specific and general legislative activity, 1660-1800
1660-1688
1689-1714
1714-1760
1760-1800
1660-1800
Acts
359
1 173
2635
6206
10373
Specific
Failures
585
697
7'4
1903
3899
0/
Success
380
627
787
76-5
727
Acts
205
579
9'4
2145
3843
General
Failures
851
985
568
722
3126
/o
Success
'9'4
37-0
617
74-8
55'i
Source: Statutes at large; Journals of the house of commons; Journals of the house of lords.
the Glorious revolution was in small measure the result of more specific acts
being passed than before. More striking, however, is that it is clear that the
growth of law making after 1760 was a response to the demand for both specific
and general measures (the proportions of each barely changing in the periods
before and after that date), though obviously the prominence of specific
legislation means that it deserves primary consideration.
As can be seen from Table 2 it was far from the case that specific and general
legislative initiatives had the same pattern of success and failure. Whereas only
just over a half of attempts at general legislation succeeded through the whole
period, for specific initiatives it was nearly three quarters.20 This difference was
most marked before 1689 and gradually narrowed to insignificance by the
close of the eighteenth century. The high success rates of specific legislative
initiatives suggests that they were often seen as relatively unproblematic by
parliamentarians. Any powers or rights granted were, by definition, limited
80
 It is not always easy to tell from the Journals whether a failed initiative had a local or a
general significance. If there is a bias it is likely that too many have been counted as general. With
acts, where both a full title and text survives, ascription should be more accurate.
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and unlikely to cause broad problems. Just the opposite was the case with
general legislation. Consequently, as Maitland put it, in the eighteenth
century 'A vast majority of statutes he would class rather as privilegia than as
leges; the statute lays down no general rule, but deals only with a particular
case.'21 Two other interrelated factors may have been at work. First that for
general legislation the era before c 1714 was essentially one of experimentation,
of trial and literally error. The reasons for this relate not only to the exigencies
of the time but also to the fact that attempts to create a new basis to
government came from both within and outside of government. Hayton has
suggested that in the 1690s and 1700s government struggled, sometimes
unsuccessfully, to control legislative initiatives concerned with public
business.22 By the 1730s the government appears to have exerted more
influence over general legislation. It is worth underlining that in the 25 years
from 1689 to 1714 there were 985 unsuccessful attempts at general legislation,
whereas in the 46 years from 1714 to 1760 there were only 568. Yet in the same
periods the number of general acts rose from 579 to 914. It is possible that the
intense political pressures of the period from the Restoration to, roughly, the
Septennial Act, may well have contributed to the high casualty rate of general
legislative measures. Killing such bills was central to the political struggles of
that era. If the distinction between governmental and non-governmental
legislation was often blurred, and if by the middle of the eighteenth century
many general measures continued to emerge from across the political nation,
there is no doubt that by the second quarter of the eighteenth century the
government exerted much more control over the general legislation considered
by parliament. Indeed, it is possible that patterns of successful and unsucessful
general legislative activity provide a crude indicator of the much vaunted
growth of political stability.
Distinguishing between specific and general legislation only scratches the
surface of the nature of legislative activity in this period. Consideration of
patterns of demand can be taken further by examining the subject matter of
acts and failed initiatives. To do this a scheme has been devised employing ten
major categories, resting upon 31 sub-categories which in turn derive from 177
particular ones.23 Inventing and employing classificatory schemes involves
taking liberties, for it is a deliberate simplification to allow generalizations to
be made. Furthermore, acts and initiatives have, for the most part, been coded
only on the basis of their titles which, occasionally, were opaque or actually
misleading. Finally, any categorization will throw up problems of border
cases. For example, is legislation that sought to lay duties upon imports to
protect domestic industries to be classed under 'finance' or 'economy'? To
circumvent this all legislative activity has been allowed two codes, though for
21
 F. W . Mai t l and , The constitutional history of England (Cambr idge , 1908), p . 382.
22
 J. Hoppit, J. Innes & J. Styles, 'Towards a history of parliamentary legislation, 1660-1800',
Parliamentary History, x x (1994), 318.
23
 I a m grateful for the assistance given here by David H a y t o n and his team at the History of
Parliament.
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Table 3. Subject distribution of acts, 1660-1800 (as percentage of all acts in periods)
Personal*
Government
Finance
Law and order
Religion
Armed services
Social issues
Economy
Communications
Miscellaneous
1660-88
42'9
3'4
12-4
9-0
7-6
3'4
3'9
11-9
4'1
1-4
IOO'O
1688-1714
48-0
6-2
13-9
6-i
47
4-6
3'3
77
5-I
0-4
IOO'O
1714-60
34-8
3-6
1 ri
5'4
37
3'3
3-9
136
ig-6
I - I
1 oo-o
1760-1800
18-3
2 7
1 ri
2 7
2 7
38
6 1
30-9
2I-6
O-2
IOO'O
1660-180O
27-1
3H
"•5
4-0
3'4
3-8
5" 1
23-0
183
IOO'O
Source: Statutes at large.
* Personal legislation was largely concerned with private matters, especially estates
and inheritance. The other categories should be self-explanatory.
reasons of space only the primary codes will be considered here.24 For acts the
evidence is presented in Table 3.
Four types of acts were especially common: personal, economy, communi-
cations and finance, together accounting for nearly eight out often of the total.
That other categories produced far fewer acts is not surprising and helps to
demonstrate the one-dimensional nature of counting acts. Religion provides a
case in point. Under the later Stuarts religious issues had been at the very
heart of constitutional conflicts. But, on the one hand, if they were considerable
they were also few and well defined. On the other hand, such was the intensity
of religious controversy that before 1714 it proved hard to pass any legislation
in that area (see Table 5 below). Attempts, for example, to enact against
Sabbath breaking were seen as innocent and fundamental by some, but as
doctrinaire by others. Consequently, religious issues did not produce a torrent
of law making, but did produce legislation of the importance of the Test and
Toleration acts. Later, Walpole managed largely to take religion off the
parliamentary agenda. When it returned it did so infrequently, but often at
great cost, as the Jew bill and Gordon riots attest. Consequently, through most
of the period, religious legislation was usually local and specific, concerned
with splitting or merging parishes, altering the rights of presentment and
church income.
Of the four major categories of legislation finance accounted for the fewest
acts. Its contribution remained remarkably steady over the period as a whole.
84
 Those acts and failed initiatives which addressed more than two subjects have been classed
under 'Miscellaneous'.
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Table 4. Subject distribution of failed initiatives, 1660-1800 (as percentage of all
failures in periods)
Personal
Government
Finance
Law and order
Religion
Armed services
Social issues
Economy
Communications
Miscellaneous
1660-88
19-2
6-2
8-6
13-0
14-1
2-4
8-4
20-0
6-2
I'9
1 oo-o
1688-1714
18-4
10-5
I3-5
I I - 5
6-3
5-o
9'9
17-2
6-6
r i
IOO'O
1714-60
22-8
7-i
8 0
10-3
4-i
3-6
io-1
177
15-1
1-2
1 oo-o
I 760-1800
I0"9
8-2
6-4
59
2'5
i '4
io-6
337
19-6
0 8
IOO'O
1660-1800
16-6
8 2
8-8
9'5
6-i
2-9
99
24-0
12-9
1-2
1 oo-o
Sources: Journals of the house of commons; Journals of the house of lords.
However, as Table 4 and more especially Table 5 show, this stability masks
important changes that took place.
In all periods except the reigns of William and Anne the success rate of
finance legislation was markedly higher than average. But between 1689 and
1714 there was a large number of failed initiatives relating to finance, though
most concerned private not public finance. Indeed, the success rate for public
finance legislation was 66-o per cent but for private finance only 247 per cent.
In fact, the expansion of the ' fiscal-military state' in the 1690s and 1700s was
not, in legislative terms, especially experimental or risky.25 But legislators were
much more reluctant to throw the weight of statute law behind what might be
called 'bubble economics'.26 After the accession of George I the success rate
of finance legislative initiatives was high, partly because in the realm of private
finance developments requiring the force of new laws were few, partly because
for public finance the government now had much clearer control over supply
bills, even in the era of innovation under Pitt the younger.27
The second major category of legislation was communications. Before 1714
legislation in this category was very infrequent. Thereafter it accounted for
25
 A number of the developments in the 1690s and 1700s had their origins earlier, in some
cases in the Interregnum. See C. D. Chandaman, The English public revenue 1660-1688 (Oxford,
1 9 7 5 ) ; H . R o s e v e a r e , The financial revolution 1660-1760 (1991) .
26
 See J . K . Horsef ie ld , British monetary experiments, 1650-1710 ( 1 9 6 5 ) ; W . R . Sco t t , The constitution
and finance of the English, Scottish and Irish joint-stock companies to 1720, 3 vols. ( C a m b r i d g e , 1 9 1 0 - 1 2 ) ;
K. G. Davies, 'Joint-stock investment in the later seventeenth century', Economic History Review, rv
(1951-2), 283-301.
27
 J . E . D . B i n n e y , British public finance and administration, 1774-92 (Oxfo rd , 1958) ; J . E h r m a n ,
TheyoungerPitt: the years of acclaim ( 1 9 6 9 ) , c h . 10 ; P . K . O ' B r i e n , ' T h e pol i t i ca l e c o n o m y of Bri t ish
t a x a t i o n , 1 6 6 0 - 1 8 1 5 ' , Economic History Review, 2 n d ser. X L I (1988) , 1-32.
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Table 5. Success rates of legislative initiatives by subject, 1660-1800
Personal
Government
Finance
Law and order
Religion
Armed services
Social issues
Economy
Communications
Miscellaneous
All
1660-88
46-8
17-6
36-3
21-4
•7-5
35-2
I5-5
189
20-5
22'2
28-2
1688-1714
73-'
37-9
51-8
35'6
43-9
488
25-9
3 1 8
44-8
26-9
51-0
1714-60
80-9
58-1
79-4
59'4
71-0
72-0
5 1 5
67-9
78-2
72-2
73-5
1760-1800
84-2
51-0
847
58-7
77'4
89-3
64-9
74-5
77-8
42-9
76-1
1660-1800
76-8
45'5
72-5
46-1
52-9
72-5
5i-3
65-9
74-2
457
66-9
Sources: Statutes at large; Journals of the house of commons; Journals of the house of lords.
about a fifth of all acts. Nearly three-quarters of acts in this category were
concerned with turnpikes, though a significant number dealt with bridge
building, harbour developments, river improvements and canals. Most of
these acts were obviously local in origin and concern and were related
intimately to economic improvement. They are a vivid example of the ways
commercial groups utilized political authority for essentially narrow financial
ends. Frequently monopoly rights were granted and, additionally, business-
men and investors well knew that parliament could provide exemplary
security for their speculations. But there is a caveat to this for many
communications acts explicitly either continued, amended, explained or,
rarely, repealed existing legislation. We get a sense here of the caution of
legislators, even in granting highly local and specific rights. They were
prepared to grant such rights only for limited terms to ensure that they
remained restricted and liable to frequent reconsideration. In the late 1760s
about 40 per cent of local communications acts rested directly upon prior
legislation. A decade later this had risen to just short of 80 per cent and for the
rest of the century it was about 60 per cent. Parliament may have been readily
available to those businessmen carving out a new infrastructure but it was
determined to keep a watching brief on what was taking place.28
Over the whole period just under a quarter of all acts concerned the
economy - about 70 per cent being enclosure acts. Next in numerical
significance among the sub-groups came legislation dealing with: external
trade (about 16 per cent of economy acts); the regulation of internal trade in
general terms (as in controls on middlemen, weights and measures and the
28
 E. Pawson, Transport and economy: the turnpike roads of eighteenth century Britain (1977), esp. chs.
3-5 raises many important issues concerning turnpike legislation.
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restriction or encouragement of consumption); agricultural production (as
opposed to land distribution); and manufactures. For want of space only one
dimension of enclosure legislation will be considered further here.
As is well known, in the eighteenth century enclosure acts were concentrated
in two periods, separated by a marked trough. The first peak was in the
1776/7 session when there were 92. A collapse then followed, such that in the
admittedly fairly short session of 1783/4 only three were passed. Yet by 1796/7
the next peak of 84 was reached. This was a startling rise, fall and rise, with
profound implications for the way parliament needs to be considered. Many
historians have explained this chronology largely in demand side terms,
particularly the investment climate. For Turner the question was simply
'Were interest rates or prices the more potent factor? '29 The importance of the
answer to that question is not doubted, but another question might be posed.
Did parliament vary in its receptiveness of attempts at enclosure legislation?
Between the advent of the main enclosure movement in the 1750s and the
1780/1 session that marked the beginning of the trough, success rates of
enclosure legislation were often in excess of 80 per cent, only once going
beneath 70 per cent.30 Yet in the four sessions leading to the nadir of 1783/4
the success rate averaged exactly 50 per cent. Whether this decline was due to
parliament changing its procedures or to a deterioration in the quality of
initiatives being presented is difficult to say, but there is some evidence that the
former played a part. That there was some unease in parliament by the early
1780s is shown by the appointment of a committee to consider 'of proper
Regulations, to be inserted in Bills... with respect to the making and keeping
in Repair the Roads in such Inclosures'.31 In March 1781 two of the
committee's resolutions were then adopted as standing orders: that public
roads had to be kept clear and fenced off; and that enclosure commissioners
should appoint salaried surveyors to make and keep public roads in repair, to
be paid for by the sale of land or a rate on owners of the lands.32 These orders
would have raised the costs of enclosure which would, in turn, have influenced
the number of initiatives brought before parliament. Parliament was, of
course, largely a body of landowners, employing all of the assumptions and
aspirations of that group.33 Yet it was not irresponsible within those terms and
29
 M . T u r n e r , Enclosures in Britain 1750-1830 (1984), p . 47.
30
 This is calculated from the slightly larger sub-category o f ' T h e l a n d ' , a category that was
overwhelmingly domina ted by enclosure legislation. In 1762/3 the rate was 57-6 per cent.
31
 Journals of the house of commons, x x x v i n (1780-2) , 224.
32
 Journals of the house of commons, x x x v i n (1780-2) , 232, 288.
33
 J . M . Neeson, Commoners: common right, enclosure and social change in England, iyoo-1820
(Cambridge, 1993), p. 274. For parliament's handling of enclosure legislation see: J. M. Martin,
'Members of parliament and enclosure: a reconsideration', Agricultural History Review, xv (1980),
101—9; W. E. Tate, 'The Commons Journals as sources of information concerning the eighteenth-
century enclosure movement', Economic Journal, LIV (1944), 75—95; idem, 'Opposition to
parliamentary enclosure in eighteenth-century England', Agricultural History Review, xrx (1945),
137—42; idem., 'Parliamentary counter-petitions during enclosures of the eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries', English Historical Review, LIX (1944), 393-403.
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it is possible that procedural changes could influence the investment decisions
of landowners looking to enclose via legislation.
Over a quarter of all acts between 1660 and 1800 were 'personal'.34 Most
striking, in the period 1689—1714 this category provided very nearly a half of
all acts. If this dominance had waned by 1800 many personal acts were still
being passed. An overwhelming majority concerned estates in one form or
another, most usually regarding landownership and inheritance, as in the
binds of wills, settlements and guardianships. These acts, therefore, dealt with
individual families, exclusively elite families and properly looked at provide a
colourful soap opera of the period. More to the point they show, when put
alongside enclosure legislation, the extent to which legislative activity was
being used by the upper echelons of society to further their particular interests.
It may be true that, with regard to general principles, ' the eighteenth century
was, so far as land law is concerned, a period of legislative quiescence', but
with regard to particular cirucmstances it is quite untrue.38
What explains this plethora of estate acts?36 Partly it was simply the value
of an act of parliament itself. As has been noted ' The private estate act was
cheaper to obtain and a much faster process than a suit in chancery. Instead
of being at the mercy of the lawyers, an estate bill went before two bodies of
men who were almost exclusively landowners themselves.'37 But the need for
such acts reflects the growth of settlements as a device in estate management
after the Restoration and that only the power of parliament could readily
change such arrangements.38 With more such settlements being created, more
acts would be needed to change them when they foundered upon the rocks of
altered circumstances or aspirations. Those circumstances were in general
terms either demographic or financial. It may also be that the demographic
failure of the elite fully to reproduce itself before c. 1740 left many settlements
uncertain, requiring the clarification of legislation.39 Habakkuk, however, has
also stressed the need to view such legislation in terms of the need to sell, that
is to the income and debt problems landowners could face.40 Certainly Evelyn
put these acts down to 'the wonderfull prodigality & decay of Families'.41 If
34
 Most of this legislation has been little studied by historians, though divorce and
naturalization acts have been-neither were numerically significant. S. Wolfram, 'Divorce in
England 1700-1857', Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, v (1985), 155-86; L. Stone, Road to divorce:
England 1530-tg8? (Oxford, 1990), part x; D. A. Statt, 'The controversy over the naturalization
of foreigners in England, 1660-1760' (University of Cambridge, Ph.D. thesis, 1987).
36
 A. W. B. Simpson, A history of the land law, 2nd edn (Oxford, 1986), p. 271. Holdsworth
adopts a similar position in his History, xi, 586-94.
36
 Some points are in M. Bond, 'Estate acts of parliament', History, XLIX (1964), 325-8.
37
 B. English & J . Saville, Strict settlement: a guide for historians (Hul l , 1983), p . 50.
38
 L. Bonfield, Marriage settlements, 1601-1740: the adoption of strict settlement ( C a m b r i d g e , 1983),
especially pp . 86 -7 .
39
 Summarized in J . V . Beckett, The aristocracy in England, 1660-1914 (Oxford, 1986), p p . 5 8 - 6 5 ;
L. Stone & J . C. Fawtier Stone, An open elite? England 1540-1880 (Oxford, 1984), p p . 86-104 .
40
 H . J . Habakkuk , ' T h e rise and fall of English l anded families, 1600-1800: 11', Transactions
of the Royal Historical Society, 5th ser. xxx (1980), 202.
41
 The diary of John Evelyn, ed. E. S. de Beer, 6 vols. (Oxford, 1955), v, 209, 21 May 1695.
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that were the main factor at work we might initially assume that such
prodigality was randomly distributed over time. Was it? Here the specific
chronology of estate legislation must be considered, for which see Figure 4.
The Glorious Revolution was followed by an explosion in the number of
personal acts, rising steeply to a peak of 59 in 1705/6 (63 per cent of all acts
passed in that session). A sharp fall followed over the next decade until slow
recovery set in. For the last 40 years of the eighteenth century we can see a rise,
fall and rise that is very reminiscent of enclosure legislation. Discussion of this
chronology will concentrate on the periods i689-i7ioand 1760-1800. For the
first period one explanation of the great rise would resort again to issues of the
length and predictability of parliamentary sessions after 1688. Before then the
success rate of personal legislation was rather less than half, but between 1689
and 1714 it was nearly three-quarters. It is possible that the advent of
predictability in the meeting of parliament after 1688 released much pent-up
demand for estate acts. It is unlikely, however, that this would explain the
great falling off of personal legislation after 1705/6. In fact, after the Glorious
Revolution contemporaries very soon recognized that parliament was being
swamped with applications for such acts. In February 1692 two MPs 'spoke
mightly against private bills, the number and multitude of them'. In
December of the same year one of these, Sir Edward Seymour, ' inveighed
much against private bills and the many mischiefs arising therefrom, and said
the business of the Lords was upon appeals and this House was taken up with
private bills to destroy the settlement of estates in England.'42 Soon the Lords
addressed the problem and, through a series of standing orders, sought to
control the work the landed elite were putting their way. The great fall-off in
the number of personal acts after 1705/6 may well bear witness to the effect
these orders had.43 There is then a clear supply side explanation for both the
rise and fall of personal legislation between 1689 and 1710. Perhaps, though,
demand side issues also had a part to play. Certainly contemporary country
propagandists thought landowners were in dire straits in the 1690s and 1700s,
declaiming against what is now called the 'financial revolution', especially the
burden of the land tax.44 No doubt at the very least such propaganda was an
exaggeration, but perhaps landowners were being hit hard and estate acts are,
so to speak, the pips squeaking? There were, of course, other ways landowners
could run into financial difficulties, through over expenditure (especially
connected to country house building and the London season) and the
disruption of income flows, though it is improbable that these would have
chronologically coincided with the pattern of estate acts.
48
 The parliamentary diary of Narcissus Luttrell i6gi-i6gs,eA. H . Horwitz (Oxford, 1972), pp . 189,
323-
43
 See especially those orders m a d e in 1705 and 1706 in Journals of the house of lords, x v m
(1705-9), 20, 70, 105-6, 183-4.
44
 See P. G. M . Dickson, The financial revolution in England: a study in the development of public credit
i688-iy?j6(1967), ch. 2; C. Brooks, 'Taxation, finance and public opinion, 1688—1714' (University
of Cambridge Ph.D. thesis, 1971); G. Holmes, British politics in the age of Anne (revised edn 1987),
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1660 1681 1705/6 1724 1742/3 1760/1 1779/80 1798/9
Fig. 4. Number of Personal acts, 1660-1800 (7 session moving average).
One of the most marked features of Figure 4 is that the pattern of personal
legislation after 1760 shows many similarities to that of enclosure acts. The
reasons for this can only be speculated upon here. One possibility is that in
that period estate acts were often quasi-enclosures (in the sense of
redistributions of landownership), susceptible to the same influences upon
investment decisions as enclosure proper. That is to say, the graph of estate
acts mimicked that of enclosure acts. This has much to recommend it. But
perhaps it was sometimes the other way round? Perhaps enclosure acts were
sometimes attempts to make ends meet. Estate acts are often seen as born of
financial shortfalls requiring the reordering of a family's landholdings, that is
they are viewed negatively, as desperate remedies. Enclosure acts by contrast
are usually viewed more positively, as commercially orientated efforts to seize
available opportunities. Yet if it is hard to distinguish the real motives for
enclosure, whether they were positive or negative, there is no reason simply to
assume the former always held sway.
I l l
Before the Glorious revolution the legislative output of parliament was
infrequent, unpredictable and numerically inconsiderable. There was a
transformation, a revolution, as a consequence of the events of 1688 and 1689.
In legislative terms, by the early eighteenth century parliament had a new
place in the social, economic and political life of the country. That place was
especially dependent upon the needs of state (especially waging war, ordering
colonial relations and maintaining economic and social stability) and the
economic needs of individuals and small interest groups. Legislative expansion
enhanced central, local and individual authority.
There was nothing more powerful than an act of parliament. Commentators
before and after 1688 were happy to see parliament (as king, Lords and
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Commons) not just as a supreme authority but as an absolute one. Locke
wrote that 'This Legislative is not only the supreatn power of the Common-wealth,
but sacred and unalterable in the hands where the Community have once
placed it'. Addison made a very similar point in 1715 and it was developed
famously by Blackstone: Parliament
hath sovereign and uncontrollable authority in making, confirming, enlarging,
restraining, abrogating, repealing, reviving, and expounding of laws, concerning
matters of all possible denominations, ecclesiastical, or temporal, civil, military,
maritime, or criminal: this being the place where that absolute despotic power, which
must in all governments reside somewhere, is entrusted by the constitution of these
kingdoms.45
That particular despotic power was only available intermittently before 1688,
but was always available thereafter. For the monarch, church and nation
parliament focused power and responsibilities in remarkable and relatively
public ways. It gave, or at least made available, authority to all parts of the
constitution.46
Legislative authority, however, if absolute was not unrestrained or
unstructured. The relatively public nature of the legislative process altered
accountability in small but significant ways. It also contributed to critical
changes taking place in the ways policy was formed and politics was
conceived. The structure of bill readings and the opportunities for debate had
important consequences. First, though each bill was treated individually, each
also had to leap through a series of well-established hoops. These hoops could
never be done away with, though political manipulation might change their
height or angle. So, secondly, bills did have to be justified and their worth
proved publicly. Assumptions, prejudices and dogma could still carry the day,
but increasing resort was made to arguments and information to prove the
point. Outside parliament, significant changes occurred with the development
of the press, broadly defined, interest groups and lobbying. Within parliament
select committees often had to trawl through a morass of opinions and
information. For much general legislation in 1696 there was a breakthrough,
though one dependent upon developments dating back at least to the
Interregnum. From that date, through the central bureaucracies for customs,
shipping and the board of trade, parliament was able to call on a mass of
information to help with its business. Because of seventeenth-century
developments, eighteenth-century policy making was not as ill conceived or
short sighted as is often made out, though it was generally speaking
constructed from within the mental world of the elite.
Most legislation was local and much of it demand led. In a sense there was
a consumer culture among the elite here, with emulation being a powerful
45
 J . Locke, Two treatises of government, ed. P. Laslett (Cambridge, i 9 9 i ) , p . 356;J . Addison, The
Freeholder, ed. J . Leheny (Oxford, 1979), p . 107; W. Blackstone, Commentaries on the laws of England,
4 vols. (Oxford, 1765-9), 1, 156.
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factor encouraging key developments.47 More significantly, Langford has
noted that much local legislation had the effect of creating a wide range of new
authorities within the nation, and with them new places of power and
opportunity.48 Many of these authorities were turnpike trusts; some were poor
law authorities, improvement commissioners, charity trustees and the like.
Such authorities were integral to the process of transformation of local
economy, society and polity at the time. That the provenance of these
authorities was local needs to be underlined, for localism remained a very
powerful force. Within their own areas these authorities frequently held
monopoly or quasi-monopoly rights. Here one can see the intimate exercise of
power. But another crucial point was that parliament was, after 1688,
available to these individuals and groups in ways it had not been previously,
even in the days of the Long parliament and Interregnum. The institutional-
ization of parliament within the government of the nation now made available
to the localities a powerful voice at the centre and the opportunity to
underwrite particular, even personal, ambitions. Through the eighteenth
century parliament was generally happy to do that. Consequently, many of
the sources of tension that had existed between centre and locality in the
seventeenth century were eased; now local elites had real and in some senses
predictable access to power at the centre, even if that power was limited.49
For many within the upper echelons of society, the expansion of legislation
was central to their financial hopes and commercial aspirations. Without the
changes that followed 1689 we might doubt whether estate settlements could
so readily have been altered, turnpikes built and fields enclosed. Much other
legislation was similarly concerned with wealth and income. Yet in two
obvious ways this caused problems. Firstly, if many statutes made financial
sense for their sponsors for others they could be costly and oppressive. The loss
of common rights under enclosure, the proscriptions of the game laws and the
privatization of infrastructural maintenance could all hit local poor people
hard.80 Second, making so many new laws created problems for those who
were meant to know the law. This was an issue both of size and composition.
Parliament shied away from general acts and passed instead thousands of
47
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particular acts (though there were some consolidating acts). The 'extensive
code of positive laws' was in a ' crude and indigested state' making it hard to
see a pattern and a rationale to the law.51 As one contemporary put it ' the
preserving such numbers of laws has been attended with this inconvenience,
that by the multiplicity of them the knowledge of the law is rendered less clear
and certain.'52 Such a concern had been vigorously expressed in the
seventeenth century, but it became especially pressing in the eighteenth. It is
not just the writings of Blackstone and Bentham which bear witness to this, but
also those abridgements of statutes and handbooks for justices and other law
officers published through the century.53
Though in the eighteenth century the political nation generally welcomed
its enhanced capacity to legislate it was soon aware that this was not politically
neutral. First, remember that before 1688 bills were often lost because of the
erratic nature of sessions. Consequently, when the finger of blame was pointed,
promoters of bills and those interested in their success could rarely single out
the efforts of particular local MPs, or the strength of alternative interests. After
1688, however, this changed. Now it was possible to praise or criticize MPs
over the fate of bills.54 Consequently, elections might have a local legislative
dimension, with MPs judged on past performance and future promises.55 And
because bills had now to be actively opposed to try to ensure their demise, the
morphology of political communities also began to change. A number of
routes were possible, such as lobbying, treating and petitioning. The last of
these offers vivid evidence of the types of organizations and senses of
community which were being renegotiated, especially diough not exclusively
after 1688.56 Petitioning campaigns soon became one way in which bills could
be supported or opposed. Early in 1718, for example, 91 petitions poured into
the Commons from the leather industry across England and Wales.57 There is
51
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little doubt that this was a concerted campaign to present a particular point
of view. The organizational skills and sense of community needed to do this
were considerable. Not that such groups were impotent, voiceless or altogether
lacking in a collective self consciousness in the sixteenth and seventeenth
centuries. There had been lobbying and petitioning then.58 But the heightened
role of parliament after 1688, along with other developments such as
journalism, changed the parameters in vital ways. Legislative possibilities
could impact significantly upon the structuring and consciousness of local
political communities.
A question suggests itself from this. If parliament was particularly available
to interested parties to solve problems and seize opportunities after 1688 how
were those problems addressed before then (though this is not to suggest that
parliament was the only available route) ? It is clear that in part there were
real attempts to use the parliamentary process in the Restoration era. But the
high failure rate of initiatives in that period shows that parliament could only
help to a limited extent. Many ambitions were frustrated. How else were these
problems solved? Here it is only possible to speculate. Perhaps the role of the
county elite was critical, helping to mediate, order, direct and control their
domains. Innovations were made after the Restoration by local administrators
to tackle the growing problems they faced. They could find ways to maintain
the highways, repair bridges and care for the poor.59 Another alternative to
parliament was resort to the law courts. There is evidence that society was
particularly litigious in the seventeenth century. Brooks has noted that ' In
1640 there was probably more litigation per head of population going through
the central courts at Westminster than at any time before or since. But 100
years later in 1750, the common law hit what appears to have been a
spectacular all-time low.'60 It is known, for example, that piecemeal private
enclosure, most of which took place before 1700, was often undertaken
utilizing the authority of chancery.81 A third route would have been to call
upon executive authority. In particular, resort was made to the privy council
58
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to seek solutions. We know very little about how the council worked after the
Restoration and too easily leap from the fact that it was of dwindling
significance to the belief that it was therefore of no significance. In fact it
continued to undertake business on some scale in the Restoration era and
beyond, but no systematic study is available of what that business was.62 A
number of initiatives to overhaul the sub-committee structure of the privy
council in the Restoration era, especially with regard to colonial and economic
matters, were taken and had some real impact on policy and relations between
London, the nation and empire.63 And privy council patents, which had been
of some importance to economic regulation before 1642, continued to be issued
after the Restoration, though at reduced levels. Even in the eighteenth century
there was some overlap between what parliament and the council did.84 One
means of exercising executive authority was via proclamations. Here there was
something of a pattern for James II issued 1 -7 per month in his reign, but Anne
only half that rate.66 But whether this is accounted for by the rise in statutes
is a moot point, for the subject matter of legislation and proclamations, if
overlapping, did not perfectly coincide, though it does appear that occasionally
after 1688 the crown used parliament where once it had simply instructed.
What is clear is that the tables and graphs of legislation explored in this
article relate to an unknowable number of' problems' which might have been
solved by parliament. Although it is likely that after 1688 a growing
proportion of such problems were dealt with by parliament, this is a
supposition, no more. It must be remembered that there were other avenues
which might be taken and perhaps the growth of the number of such problems
was even more rapid than the rise in the number of acts. A final qualification
can be made. In his Two treatises Locke wrote that ' Laws, that are at once, and
in a short time made, have a constant and lasting force'.66 In 1704 Defoe put
another case. He noted ' the Multitude of Statutes which are superseded by
Custom, and now lie Dormant in England, as things grown Obsolete and
unregarded, till the People begin to forget there are any such Laws in Being;
such are the Laws against Relieving Beggars, the Weights, Measures, and
62
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Quality of Provisions, and the like'.67 Locke, of course, was advancing a more
general, more theoretical position; Defoe the more limited, practical position.
This article has stressed not just the rise in law making but also the potency
offered by such laws. However, Defoe rightly drew attention to the fact that
many statutes had in effect a short or limited life span. Though most remained
on the statute books for decades or even centuries, many should be considered
more as temporary expedients than as permanent imprints upon society. This
was underlined of course by the discretion available to local authorities in
enforcing the law.68 Most acts, once again, were local not national in their
concerns and less the product of some considered policy than the outcome of
parliament responding in varied ways to different initiatives being devised by
individuals or small groups - mistrust of the executive may have been central
here. With some justice Maitland complained that the lawmakers in the
eighteenth century seemed 'afraid to rise to the dignity of a general
proposition'.69 At times almost farcical situations could develop, with
parliament unable or unwilling to legislate in an adequately positive or
general fashion. It had, for example, to pass ten separate acts - not to mention
the ten failed attempts - to allow the building and maintenance of Westminster
bridge.
The transformation of the legislative output of parliament is one of the
'great facts' of this period. Its significance is, however, much broader than the
immediate purposes aimed at by the acts passed or attempted. The historian
of legislation must, of course, make the content of bills and acts their initial
concern. But a full study of legislative activity can tell us much about the ways
parliament became an institution, about relations between centre and locality,
about the changing nature of political communities, about the strength of
commercial ambitions across the political nation, and about the fundamental
distribution of power within society. Too often the parliamentary history of
the eighteenth century has been conceived largely in terms of parties,
ministries, constitutional battles and 'great men'. Notoriously, Namier's
vision of the structure of politics was rather narrowly conceived.70 Only slowly,
through a widening of horizons to include ideology, ' low politics' and the
contribution of the middling sort has a sense of the possibilities and
significance of a wider structural history of politics become possible. This
article has tried to show that a history of legislation also deserves to be part of
this broader view and that it is especially amenable to systematic analysis. It
has attempted to provide only an introduction to what is possible. But
hopefully it is clear that behind the graphs, tables and trends lie issues of
fundamental importance for an understanding of late seventeenth and
eighteenth-century society, economy and polity.
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